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The Realistic Desirability of Perfection in Thomas More’s Utopia and John Milton’s 
Paradise Lost 
1. Introduction 
Thomas More’s Utopia and John Milton’s Paradise Lost both discuss perfect worlds 
and ideal societies. Yet, both literary works also suggest how that perfection is unrealistic and 
undesirable. More’s Utopia describes the religious, social, and political practices that ensure 
the prosperity and stability of a perfect island society called Utopia. On the surface, it seems 
like the author approves of Utopian practices since Hythloday so fervently recommends them 
to More’s character. However, the closing comments and critiques on Utopian practices by 
both characters create a mood of ambivalence towards Utopian practices, thus leading readers 
to question the realistic desirability of Utopian practices in an actual human society. 
Meanwhile, Milton’s Paradise Lost describes the original Garden of Eden and how we lost 
that perfection. Adam and Eve’s sin is explicitly bemoaned and lamented, but then several 
characters provide consolation by suggesting how something better shall be achieved through 
the Fall. Though their reasonings differ, Milton and More both posit through their works that 
though humanity thinks they desire perfection, they actually prefer contexts of imperfection. 
Milton suggests how our fallenness gives us the opportunity to achieve greater joys than what 
we had in the Garden of Eden while More suggests how human pride makes perfection 
impossible and undesirable to humanity. 
Since many Utopian practices require people to completely ignore their prideful 
instincts, humanity’s pride would ultimately reject and rebel against the measures required to 
ensure the social and economic stability in a perfect, utopian society. Hythloday and More’s 
character reflect this argument in their closing comments.  As the text ends, Hythloday once 
again praises Utopian practices and wishes that the world would be so wise as to imitate 
them, but he also admits that it would be unrealistic to implement Utopian practices in the 
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world because human pride would be too big a hindrance (More 146).  Meanwhile, More’s 
character states that there are many Utopian practices he wishes to see in the world’s 
governments, though he cannot agree with all the Utopian practices described by Hythloday 
(148). These comments imply that humanity will agree with a perfect society in the abstract, 
as Hythloday and More both praise Utopia and wish for the world to imitate their practices. 
However, Hythloday admits how pride reduces the feasibility of those practices in a real 
society while More doubts the desirability of those practices. Meanwhile, several characters 
in Milton’s Paradise Lost overtly support my argument that humanity shall achieve greater 
joys through the Fall. For example, as the angel Michael is escorting Adam and Eve out of 
Eden, he comforts them by saying, “[thou] shalt possess/ A Paradise within thee, happier far” 
(Milton 12.586-7). So, Milton suggests that the Fall, despite descending humanity into a state 
of imperfection, allows humanity to achieve greater happiness within that imperfect state. In 
this paper, I will explore the various ways in which human pride rejects perfection in More’s 
Utopia, and the various ways in which humanity may achieve greater joys through their 
imperfections in Milton’s Paradise Lost. 
Human pride may be interpreted as either a sinful pride (such as arrogance, vanity, or 
conceit) or a healthy pride (such as self-esteem or dignity). Hythloday’s reference to human 
pride seems to assume the first meaning, asserting how Utopia would be a perfect society if 
sinful pride did not reject it. My paper will use both interpretations of human pride to show 
how Utopian perfection would be rejected. My first two points use the first interpretation of 
sinful pride to heighten how humanity is imperfect and will thus not accept or fit in a perfect 
world or society. I supplement these points with my analysis of Milton’s Paradise Lost that 
suggests how we are happier in imperfect contexts anyways. My last two points use the 
second interpretation of healthy pride to highlight how Utopian perfection necessarily 
violates humanity’s self-worth and dignity, and does not allow humanity to redeem their 
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fallenness by striving against evil. I strengthen these points with my analysis of Milton’s 
Paradise Lost that shows how contexts of imperfection do allow for these things.  
 
2. Alternative Readings of Both Texts 
A few counterarguments posit how More’s Utopian practices are endorsing and 
encouraging realistic societal reforms, such as the Utopian practice of religious freedom. In 
“Religious Freedom in Thomas More's Utopia”, Sanford Kessler asserts how “Thomas More 
advocated religious freedom in Utopia to promote civic peace in Christendom and to help 
unify his fractious Catholic Church” (Kessler). He supports his interpretation by analyzing 
how religious Utopian practices influence their society. For example, he posits how they 
created a “limited type of religious freedom [that] made Utopia a theologically diverse, but 
morally unified society wholly free of religiously inspired violence” (Kessler). This analysis 
is supported by the Utopian law that “every man might be of what religion he pleased, and 
might endeavor to draw others to it by the force of argument and by amicable and modest 
ways, but without bitterness [or] violence” (More 129). This law allows Utopians the 
freedom to choose their own religion, while also preventing any religious antipathies.  
Kessler also acknowledges how Hythloday describes pride as a “plague of human 
nature” (More 146) that would obstruct religious freedom, but accounts for this pride by 
positing how “the Utopians took a certain pride in forming and maintaining their own 
religious opinions without endangering their commonwealth” (Kessler). This is supported by 
the opinions of the Utopians’ leader, Utopus, who thought that God “might inspire man in a 
different manner, and be pleased with this variety” (More 129). This belief accounts for 
human pride as Utopians may now take pride in their diverse forms of religion as being 
pleasing to God in its variety. So, Kessler strongly supports his views on religious Utopian 
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practices being a model for social reform in society, though even he must acknowledge that 
pride would be an obstacle that must be circumvented.  
Another counterargument to my thesis is Jennifer Bishop’s argument in “‘Utopia’ and 
Civic Politics in Mid-Sixteenth-Century London” that More’s Utopia reveals of “an 
engagement with ideas of 'good government'” (Bishop 933) and “[exists] as part of a dialogue 
of reform” (952). Bishop supports her argument by exploring the historical context of the 
mid-sixteenth century when commonwealth reforms were being heavily emphasized: 
“contributions to commonwealth reform in the mid-sixteenth century could take a variety of 
forms, including new legislation, such as the Vagrancy Act; re-founded institutions, such as 
the Royal Hospitals; and the publication of new or translated texts, such as Utopia” (951). 
Bishop also asserts how “each of these forms provided a framework within which civic 
reform could be conceptualized, discussed, or enacted” (951). More’s text reflects Bishop’s 
assertion, in that the text discusses the political and social practices in Utopia, such as how 
their society elects their “Prince”, “Philarch”, and “Archphilarch” (More 59). Then Bishop 
supports her argument that Utopia is part of a dialogue of reform by referencing Sara Rees 
Jones’s argument that More modelled Utopia’s capital city, Amaurotum, after London to 
suggest to Londoners the higher purpose of their own civic institutions (Bishop 951). Bishop 
supports this argument with historical context as she states how “this ‘reminder’ would have 
been particularly relevant during the Edwardian reformation, when the control of poverty and 
vagrancy became a civic responsibility after the dissolution of religious houses and 
institutions” (951). Overall, though Bishop’s argument of Utopia being a realistic call for 
reform is strongly supported by historical evidence and other scholars, her argument lacks 
textual evidence and does not address the realistic desirability of those Utopian reforms when 
implemented in an actual human society.  
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Several arguments are also made against my interpretation of Milton’s Paradise Lost, 
such as Noam Reisner’s argument that Paradise Lost sees humanity’s Fall as inauspicious 
and damning. In John Milton's “Paradise Lost”: A Reading Guide, Reisner argues that 
“Adam and Eve’s loss of paradise [was] for Milton…an event of calamitous moral and 
spiritual error which mankind has slavishly repeated throughout its fallen history” (Reisner 
1). In Milton’s eyes, humanity’s Fall in Paradise Lost symbolized a “triumph of tyranny over 
human weakness” (1) and a loss of “the single perfection and material unity of the one true 
God” (9) that humanity enjoyed before the Fall. This interpretation is supported by Milton’s 
own opening comments on humanity’s Fall. In Book 1, Milton begins his poem by describing 
“Man’s first disobedience [that…]/ Brought death into the World, and all our woe/ With loss 
of Eden” (Milton 1.1-4). “Man’s first disobedience” alludes to the original sin that caused 
humanity’s Fall, while the diction used to describe that Fall (“death”, “woe”, “loss”) heaps 
overtly negative connotations on it. This suggests that Milton has a negative perspective on 
humanity’s Fall, and that he views the Fall as the root of all the sorrow and pain in the world. 
Milton also depicts God as viewing humanity’s Fall inauspiciously. God sends an angel to 
warn Adam and Eve of “how [Satan] designs/ In them at once to ruin all mankind” (5.227-
28). God’s warning implies how the original sin will destroy mankind, tainting their 
perfection. So, there are several areas of Paradise Lost that support Reisner’s unfavourable 
interpretation of the Fall.  
There are also scholars who see Milton’s Paradise Lost as a tragedy of free will and a 
condemnation of Adam and Eve as being responsible for the Fall. In “Eve and the Doctrine of 
Responsibility in Paradise Lost”, Stella P. Revard argues that “the responsibility for [the Fall] 
lies with the husband who sanctioned [Eve’s] exposure [to Satan as this] creates the climate 
for her fall” (Revard 69). This is supported by the text as Adam is depicted as being wiser 
than Eve and reluctant to separate from her. He warns Eve, “Firm we subsist, yet possible to 
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swerve” (Milton 9.359), predicting how they may “fall into [Satan’s] deception unaware” 
(9.362). Since Adam was wiser and more prudent, his failure to advise and “shape his wife's 
decisions” leads to him “approving her freedom [and thus causing] her fall and his own” 
(Revard 69). This is shown in how Adam is aware of the dangers of separating, yet he agrees 
to separate from Eve, thus willingly exposing them both to greater temptation. 
Revard also supports her argument by noting how the Son assigns responsibility to 
Adam in Paradise Lost: “The Son [asserts] that Adam alone was responsible for his own sin. 
Yet he [also] makes Adam's responsibility almost directly proportionate to the degree he 
excelled Eve and was set in perfection and real dignity above her” (71). When Adam tries to 
blame the Fall on Eve, the Son reminds Adam that “God set [Adam] above her” (Milton 
10.149) and that Adam’s “perfection far excelled/ Hers in all real dignity” (10.150-51). That 
being said, the Son asks Adam why “to [Eve]/ [he] didst resign [his] manhood” (10.147-48). 
The Son’s speech charges Adam for not guiding Eve’s decisions and for not preventing her 
exposure to temptation. This supports Revard’s claim that Adam is responsible for the Fall in 
Paradise Lost. So far, I have discussed several arguments that refute my thesis or offer 
alternative interpretations. Nevertheless, I believe that my interpretations are beneficial and 
strongly supported by the texts, and I shall now begin supporting my arguments.  
 
3. Aversion to Rebuke, Joy of Forgiveness 
Several practices of the Utopians suggest the impracticality, from a humanist point of 
view, of this ideal society ever being realized.  For instance, the Utopian practice of constant 
surveillance, which aims to reduce vice through rebukes and instructions from others, would 
be rejected as our sinful, human pride would rebel against constant chastisement and orders 
from others. Thomas I. White supports this idea in “Festivitas, Utilitas, et Opes: The 
Concluding Irony and Philosophical Purpose of Thomas More's "Utopia"” as he argues how 
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“More consistently condemns common or public opinion as a guide to one's beliefs and 
actions” (White 141). More’s disapproval of being guided by public opinion suggests his 
ironic, rather than sincere, approach to Utopian surveillance practices that encourage 
Utopians to base their actions on the judgement of others. This ironic interpretation is 
supported by Hythloday’s stating that Utopian practices would be difficult to implement in 
other societies as sinful pride is an “infernal serpent that creeps into the breasts of mortals, 
and possesses them too much to be easily drawn out” (More 146). This comment satirizes 
previously commended Utopian practices as it suggests how human pride will realistically 
hinder the adoption of those practices. Initially, the Utopian practice where young people sit 
interspersed by the older people at mealtimes is commended for the fact that “the gravity of 
the old people, and the reverence that is due to them, might restrain the younger from all 
indecent words and gestures” (73). However, realistically, having society base their actions 
on the opinions of others may be counterintuitive since “common opinion is not shaped by 
reason and virtue, and it is therefore an unreliable guide to morality” (White 141). A satirical 
reading that factors in human pride also suggests that the young people will rebel against 
constantly having an elder “observe [their] temper” (More 74) as they will feel belittled and 
micromanaged, and consequently act out negatively. So, a satirical reading of Utopian 
practices of surveillance reveal how human pride would rebel against the desired outcomes of 
those practices.  
This argument is supported by Ronald Huebert’s “Privacy: The Early Social History 
of a Word” where he posits that More’s “comprehensive, unrelenting network of [Utopian] 
surveillance” (Huebert 22) is merely an ironic method of underscoring the importance of 
privacy in society. This ironic reading supports my satirical interpretation of Utopian 
practices as it suggests how those practices are realistically undesirable. Huebert describes 
Utopian surveillance as “worse than being followed incessantly by the ever-watchful eye of 
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Providence” (22) as the reality of Utopian surveillance would be unnerving and 
overwhelming. For example, Huebert states how “sex in Utopia is not only—and not even 
principally—a private interaction between consenting adults [but rather a] subject of 
responsible public planning” (23). This evaluation is supported by the text as Utopian couples 
are presented naked to each other before marriage to prevent any hidden defects (More 104). 
Huebert’s overt aversion to this practice provides an example of a Utopian practice of 
surveillance that would be rejected by human society, thus supporting my argument.  
Huebert supports the impracticality of Utopian practices of surveillance as he 
analyzes Andrew Marvell’s poems to show how privacy is important in protecting human 
pride: “what protects the speaker from outright ridicule is the fact that he's completely alone” 
(Huebert 24). Establishing this importance strengthens Huebert’s claim that More is 
describing ironically Utopian practices of surveillance. He supports this claim by noting how 
“Hythloday” and “Utopia” are ironic names as they respectively mean “purveyor of 
nonsense” and “nowhere” (27). Heubert provides various pieces of evidence to support his 
claim that More depicts Utopian practices of surveillance ironically in order to underscore the 
importance of privacy in society. This ironic interpretation addresses how Utopian practices 
of surveillance are realistically abhorrent and how human pride requires an opposing 
practice: privacy. So, Heubert supports my claim that More depicts Utopian practices of 
surveillance satirically to highlight how those practices would be rejected by human pride.  
Contrasting the constant chastisement and rebukes that our pride would reject in the 
perfect Utopian society, Milton suggests that humanity’s fallenness and imperfections lead us 
to greater joys by allowing us to experience God in new and different ways, such as through 
His mercy, grace, and forgiveness. John T. Shawcross supports this argument in With Mortal 
Voice: The Creation of Paradise Lost as he asserts how “we are all blind until we have 
experienced the trials of being mortal and have then bathed ourselves in the spirituality of 
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God's Logos” (Shawcross 16). So, through our fallenness, we experience more of God and 
thus achieve greater joy and spirituality. God’s mercy and forgiveness are foreshadowed by 
the angel Abdiel’s involvement with Satan and God’s pardoning of the angel’s error. After 
rebuking and rejecting Satan, Abdiel returns to heaven where God, instead of rebuking or 
punishing Abdiel, forgives Abdiel and praises him for returning. God says to Abdiel, 
“Servant of God. Well done; well hast thou fought/ The better fight” (Milton 6.29-30), 
praising Abdiel for seeking “To stand approved in sight of God” (6.36). Though God could 
condemn Abdiel for leaving Him to follow Satan, God instead shows His mercy and 
forgiveness by accepting Abdiel back into heaven and commending him for returning. This 
event foreshadows how humanity will also receive God’s mercy and forgiveness after they 
sin, thus achieving greater joys by experiencing the fullness of God.  
This comes to pass as God reacts to the Fall by sending the Son, a merciful and loving 
character who will sacrifice Himself to redeem humanity, to judge Adam and Eve. God’s 
deliberate choice of such a judge for Adam and Eve demonstrates the love and mercy He 
offers humanity after the Fall. As Shawcross asserts, “The subject of man's disobedience has 
been used to exhibit the theme of God's love” (Shawcross 27). God confesses “I intend/ 
Mercy” (Milton 10.58-59) in sending the Son, who is “Man’s friend, his mediator” (10.60). 
In turn, the Son proclaims that He will “mitigate their doom/ On [Him] derived” (10.76-77) 
and “temper so Justice with mercy” (10.77-78). This conversation displays how God treats 
humanity’s sin with loving mercy. So, despite the Fall and the doom it imposed on humanity, 
a greater joy is achieved by humanity as God now offers mercy and forgiveness, something 
we could not experience in our pre-Fall state of perfection. Instead of the constant rebukes 
required in a perfect Utopian society, Milton suggests that humanity’s imperfections allow 
them to experience forgiveness and mercy.  
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Further contrasting the unrelenting surveillance of Utopia that aims to reproach 
individuals and command them to perfection, Milton focuses on how humanity’s 
imperfections open them up to receiving God’s divine and healing grace. Benjamin Myers 
reflects this view in “Prevenient Grace and Conversion in Paradise Lost” as he argues that 
“the Fall is seen in its proper light only when it is viewed in relation to the ensuing 
intervention of the grace of God” (Myers 21). This grace is predicted in the opening lines of 
Paradise Lost as Milton foreshadows how, after the Fall, “one greater Man/ [will] Restore us, 
and regain the blissful seat” (Milton 1.4-5). Both God and the Son also mention the grace that 
will be offered to a fallen humanity; even as God predicts the Fall, He promises that 
“Man…shall find grace” (3.131); the Son repeats this promise, stating how “Man shall find 
grace” (3.227) and how grace will “find means, that finds her way/ […] to visit all [God’s] 
creatures” (3. 228-30). This grace leads humanity to greater joys as they can now experience 
God’s mercy and restoration. Accordingly, “the destructive power of the Fall is [overcome as 
God brings] good from evil by showing grace and mercy to the fallen human race” (Myers 
21). This restorative grace is described by God as He asserts how “Man shall not quite be 
lost, but sav’d who will; / […through] grace in me” (Milton 3.173-74). God declares “I will 
renew/ [humanity’s] lapsed powers” (3. 175-76) and promises that, “Upheld by me, yet once 
more [man] shall stand/ On even ground against his mortal foe” (3. 178-79). Though the Fall 
opened humanity up to imperfections, sin, and weakness, it also made humanity reliant on 
God’s grace and mercy, indirectly leading humanity to attain greater joys by experiencing 
God’s restorative grace. This benevolent consequence of imperfection starkly contrasts the 
inauspicious requirement for Utopian perfection, that is the unrelenting surveillance that aims 
to reprimand and control individuals.  
 
4. Striving to be Better Than Others, Striving to Better Ourselves 
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On another note, the Utopian practices that enforce uniformity in society would also 
be rejected by sinful, human pride because human pride pushes people to strive to be 
different (and thus better) than others. These human desires are admitted by Hythloday as he 
states how “there is in man a pride that makes him fancy it a particular glory to excel others 
in pomp and excess” (More 70). R. S. Sylvester supports this in “‘Si Hythlodaeo Credimus: 
Vision and Revision in Thomas More's ‘Utopia’” as he describes Hythloday’s descriptions of 
Utopia as “fanciful excursions [that ignore] the bleak contemporaneity of […] the stresses 
and strains of human existence” (Sylvester 276). This suggests how Utopian practices ignore 
sinful, human pride, consequently implying how human pride will inevitably create the desire 
to be different and outdo others—and thus reject the Utopian practices that enforce 
uniformity in society. For example, this human desire to outdo others is acknowledged by 
Utopians as they take pleasure in “ordering their gardens so well [due to] an emulation 
between the inhabitants of the several streets, who vie with each other” (More 57). However, 
despite acknowledging this aspect of human pride, many Utopian practices do not account for 
it as they enforce uniformity and thus prevent people from being different or better than 
others. While Hythloday supports these practices as he “advocates a complete demolition job 
on the hierarchical society of Western Europe”, More “doubts […] the validity of Utopian 
practices in […] social organization” (Sylvester 281). These doubts are supported by how 
many Utopian practices ignore the impacts of human pride. For example, people will rebel 
against “there [being] no sort of trade that is in great esteem among [Utopians]” (More 61) as 
this uniform regard prevents people from taking pride in their trade since they do not feel like 
they are different or better than anyone. Next, people will reject how “throughout the island 
[Utopians] wear the same sort of clothes, without any other distinction [and] the fashion 
never alters” (61) as this uniform apparel prevents people from taking pride in their 
appearance. Overall, several Utopian practices that enforce uniformity in society would thus 
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be rejected due to humanity’s pride pressing people to try to be different (and thus better) 
than others.  
This argument is supported by Athanasios Moulakis’s article, “Pride and the Meaning 
of ‘Utopia’”, where he asserts how More’s Utopia can only “inform the action and conduct of 
[…] man, who can then seek to do the best in the circumstances and strive to right evils in 
full awareness of the conditionality of […] all human […] action” (Moulakis 248). Moulakis 
quotes how More himself stated that “nothing will establish [Utopia] upon this earth short of 
a second coming” (247), implying how his treatise may posit ideals that cannot be realized by 
human societies. This implication is supported by the fact that “Utopia” can be translated to 
mean “nowhere” (More 5). So, Moulakis’s claim supports my own as we both posit how 
Utopia cannot be realistically established.  
Moulakis further reflects this paper’s claim as he explains how Utopia cannot be 
realistically established since one condition of human actions is pride. Utopian practices do 
not account for pride as “the absence of pride is the condition for the adoption of utopian 
institutions, not the result of their operation” (Moulakis 254). Moulakis expands on this by 
explaining how most people “would find the overwhelming sameness that goes with Utopian 
equality quite unbearable” (249), thus suggesting how the Utopian practices that enforce 
uniformity in society pose unrealistic expectations on people to overcome their sinful pride. 
One example of the overwhelming sameness in Utopia is how they all wear similar “upper 
[garments] which […] are all of one colour” (More 66). Moulakis’s analysis of Utopian 
practices supports the argument that Utopian practices expect, but cannot ensure, a dismissal 
of sinful, human pride and will thus be rejected as pride motivates people to try to outdo 
others. Moulakis also supports this argument as he emphasizes the inevitability of the sinful 
pride that is within all humans. He references “St. Benedict’s warning […] that pride is a 
monster hard to extirpate even in a monastic community” (254), thus suggesting how pride 
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will not be easily curbed by Utopian practices. Overall, Moulakis’s claims reflect and 
strengthen the point that pride will reject the uniformity of Utopia.  
Not only does sinful, human pride make us desire to be better than others by being 
different from them, human pride also propels the desire to be better than others by having 
more than they do and will thus lead human beings to reject Utopian practices that belittle 
material wealth and gain. The authors of “On Utopia—between Philosophy and 
Communism” reflect this idea as they posit how More’s “entire regime is mainly based on the 
morality of the human nature, which is in itself a trap” (Pirnuta 480) since pride seems built 
into human nature. Hythloday demonstrates an understanding of this inherent pride as he 
states how “pride thinks its own happiness shines the brighter, by comparing it with the 
misfortunes of other persons” (More 146). With this in mind, the various Utopian practices 
that devalue material wealth seem unrealistic as sinful, human pride will encourage people to 
have more than others by chasing material wealth and gain. One such Utopian practice that 
depicts people as selflessly generous is how “when [Utopians] want anything in the country 
which [their town] does not produce, they fetch that from the town, without carrying anything 
in exchange for it” (54). The generosity in this practice is unrealistic because, as Hythloday 
points out, human pride will lead us to desire to have more than others. This prideful human 
desire will then encourage those towns to expand their land and either keep their resources or 
charge other towns for them. This shows how “a regime based on human nature […] could 
not be possible. Power tends to completely change a sovereign” (Pirnuta 481) as their pride 
will persuade them to aggrandize themselves. So, human pride will rebel against these 
Utopian practices that minimalize material wealth and gain.  
Moulakis’s argument in “Pride and the Meaning of ‘Utopia’” also addresses this 
claim as he explores how pride makes monetary Utopian practices unrealistic for human 
societies. Moulakis acknowledges how Utopia’s “universal obligation to work [caused] the 
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absence of scarcity which is, in turn, the condition of the elimination of avarice” (Moulakis 
252). However, he notes how “unlike absolute scarcity, no condition of natural abundance 
and no institutions can hope to eliminate relative scarcity” (252). This relates to how sinful, 
human pride is “incapable of satiation” (252) and “counts it a glorious thing to outdo others 
in the vain ostentation of things” (253). Moulakis explains how the sensation of scarcity is a 
feeling caused by pride that desires to have more than others and can thus never be satisfied. 
This explanation strengthens my argument as it suggests how many other Utopian practices 
would be rejected by human pride. For example, Utopians believe that “the folly of men has 
enhanced the value of gold and silver because of their scarcity” (More 78) and thus devalue it 
by giving it to prisoners and children. However, Moulakis’s argument shows how this 
practice is unrealistic since, even though no one is poor, human pride will still desire to have 
more gold and silver than others due to feelings of relative scarcity.  
Furthermore, Moulakis notes how Utopian practices are unrealistic as they do not 
account for sinful, human pride: “the Utopians apparently maintain their characteristic virtues 
[…] even in situations […] where pride would certainly find scope to expand if it were 
present in their breasts” (Moulakis 254). For example, when the Utopians’ “neighbours […] 
desire that they would send [Utopian] magistrates to govern them” (More 110), Moulakis 
posits that human pride would lead those Utopian magistrates to demonstrate “favouritism or 
greed” (Moulakis 254). Overall, Moulakis argues how human pride makes the monetary 
practices of Utopia unfeasible to implement in human society.  
Apart from Moulakis, Warren W. Wooden’s “Anti-Scholastic Satire in Sir Thomas 
More's Utopia” also supports my argument against monetary Utopian practices. Wooden 
argues how More’s character in Utopia offers more realistic solutions compared to 
Hythloday’s Utopian “communistic system” which only works “in Utopia where the citizens 
are […] devoid of the unpleasant aspects of real people, [and thus] capable of socially 
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patterned perfection” (Wooden 38). Wooden continues to state how “the obvious practical 
difficulty with this [Utopian] design is that a fallible, variegated humanity will never conform 
to it” (38). These assertions suggest how the monetary Utopian practices require society to be 
perfect and devoid of human flaws, such as pride which will cause people to reject monetary 
Utopian practices.  
Wooden then expands on his argument by analysing how More’s character in Utopia 
suggests how Hythloday’s argument that “the abolition of private property and money seem 
to have made Utopia a paradise” is merely “grandiose theorizing” that has “dubious 
applicability to the real world or the problems of real people” (39). In lieu of monetary 
Utopian practices, Wooden states how More’s character suggests “a pragmatic philosophy 
suited to the world as it is” (39), thus endorsing an “acceptance of reality, [and] the adoption 
of a practical, workable philosophy” (39). Wooden’s analysis is supported by the text as 
More’s character deems Hythloday’s theories on Utopia as “speculative philosophy” and 
instead proposes “another philosophy that is more pliable, that knows its proper scene, 
accommodates itself to it, and teaches a man with propriety and decency to act that part 
which has fallen to his share” (More 42). This discourse reveals how More’s character deems 
Utopian practices as unrealistic because it does not ‘accommodate itself’ to its ‘proper scene’ 
which is the flaws of humanity, such as pride. Overall, Wooden’s arguments support the idea 
that monetary Utopian practices would be rejected since they do not realistically account for 
human pride. 
While More explores how pride seeks to be better than others and will thus reject 
several practices of a perfect Utopian society, Milton explores how we achieve greater joy in 
our imperfect, fallen state as we seek to better ourselves and repent to God, thus pleasing 
Him. Paul Hammond supports this in “Milton's Complex Words: Essays on the Conceptual 
Structure of Paradise Lost” where he explores how “before the Fall Adam and Eve were 
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naked but clothed in virtue” whereas their “nakedness after sin is full of turpitude [and] 
misery” (Hammond). Adam and Eve keenly feel this change in their nature, and are filled 
with a “shame and misery” that is “a necessary step towards [the] fruit of repentance” 
(Hammond). Adam and Eve reflect this process after the Fall, “naked left/ To guilty Shame” 
(Milton 9.1057-58) as they are “destitute and bare/ Of all their virtue” (9.1062-63). Keenly 
aware of their fallenness, they become “penitent” (11.5) and filled with “remorse” (11.6), 
striving to fix their mistake as they “confessed/ Humbly their faults” (11.8-9) from “hearts 
contrite, in sign/ Of sorrow unfeigned, and humiliation meek” (11.11-12). Humanity achieves 
greater joy through this humble repentance as the Son hears Adam and Eve’s prayers and 
describes humanity’s repentance as:  
Fruits of more pleasing savour, from thy seed  
Sown with contrition in his heart, than those 
Which, his own hand manuring, all the trees 
Of Paradise could have produced, ere fallen 
From innocence. (11.26-30) 
Due to this pleasing repentance, the Son advocates forgiveness to God, that humanity may be 
“reconciled” (11.39) with God and “may dwell in joy and bliss” (11.43) with Him. So, while 
human pride rejects Utopian perfection by seeking to be better than others, humanity’s 
fallenness leads us to greater joys by endowing us with repentant hearts that seek to better 
ourselves, which in turn please God and prompt Him to grant us greater joy and bliss. 
 Matthew Stallard strengthens this argument in John Milton, Paradise Lost: The 
Biblically Annotated Edition as he notes all the biblical allusions in Paradise Lost that 
reaffirm how God will bless those who repent to Him. Stallard notes how Adam’s plan to 
confess their sins to God “from hearts contrite, in sign/ Of sorrow unfeigned, and humiliation 
meek” (Milton 10.1091-92) alludes to the Bible verse, “The sacrifices of God are a contrite 
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spirit: a contrite and a broken heart, O God, thou wilt not despise” (King James Version, Ps 
51:17). This suggests how God will openly and eagerly accept those who repent to Him, as 
implied when God promises that He will save all who desire to be saved: “Man shall not 
quite be lost, but sav’d who will” (Milton 3.173). Stallard also relates Adam’s speech to 1 
John 1-9: “If we acknowledge our sins, He is faithful and just, to forgive us our sins, and to 
cleanse us from all unrighteousness”. This Bible verse supports how a repentant heart avails 
humanity to greater joys as it allows us to be forgiven and cleansed by a faithful God. This 
renewal is shown as “Prevenient grace descending had removed/ The stony from [Adam and 
Eve’s] hearts, and made new flesh/ Regenerate grow instead” (Milton 11.15-17). The diction 
used, such as “new” and “regenerate”, connote how God’s grace had cleansed and restored 
Adam and Eve.  
Moreover, Stallard analyses the angel Michael’s advice to Adam after the Fall: “thou 
mayest repent, /And one bad act with many deeds well done/ Mayest cover” (11.256-57). 
These lines allude to how “love shall cover the multitude of sins” (1 Peter 4:8), suggesting 
how God extends His love to those who repent. This love is foreshadowed as God plans to 
“place within [humanity] as a guide, /[His] umpire Conscience” (3.194-95) that those who 
repent and obey Him will be led and “to the end, persisting, safe arrive” (3.197). Here, Milton 
describes how humanity’s fallenness leads us to greater joys as he predicts how God will 
guide us and protect us, if we repent and obey Him. So, while human pride will reject 
Utopian perfection by seeking to be better than others, human imperfection will lead us to 
greater joys as we please God with our repentance and allow ourselves to be renewed and 
protected by Him.  
 
5. Rejecting Overwhelming Control, Embracing Free Will 
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More also describes several Utopian practices that assert an overwhelming control 
over various aspects of the Utopians’ personal lives, and such practices would be rejected by 
humanity’s pride because this pride (or sense of dignity and self-respect) would want people 
to be in control of their own personal decisions. In “Hythloday's Utopia and More's England: 
an Interpretation of Thomas More's Utopia”, Thomas S. Engeman supports this as he notes 
how “the problem of freedom […] is absent [in Hythloday’s narrative as] he is unphilosophic 
and exclusively oriented to practice” (Engeman 143). This suggests how certain Utopian 
practices do not realistically account for humanity’s reaction to their reduced autonomy. For 
example, people would reject the Utopian practice of “[shifting] their houses by lots [every 
ten years]” (More 57) as it infringes on their freedom to choose and keep their living space. 
The same applies to other forms of free movement.  If a citizen desires to travel, they must 
travel with a slave and obtain “a passport from the Prince, which both certifies the licence 
that is granted for travelling, and limits the time of their return” (75). People would reject this 
practice as it places several limitations on their freedom to travel, restricting them with the 
requirement of being accompanied by a slave, obtaining permission from authorities, and 
having limits on when they can return. Similarly onerous restrictions occur in Utopians’ 
marital lives.  Utopians “neither allow […] polygamy nor […] divorces except in the case of 
adultery or insufferable perverseness”, in these cases “the guilty are made infamous and are 
never allowed the privilege of a second marriage” (105). People would reject this practice as 
it overtly controls their personal and sexual lives, as a couple cannot divorce even if they both 
want to while an adulterer is not allowed to marry for a second time even if someone is 
willing to marry them. Though these Utopian practices theoretically promote virtue, they will 
realistically be rejected by human pride as they strictly control people’s domestic, personal, 
and sexual lives. This overwhelming control by Utopian practices and the Utopians’ 
consequent lack of autonomy and would violate our human dignity and cause our human 
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pride to rebel against such Utopian practices and insist on being in control of our own 
decisions. So More’s depiction of the extensive control exerted over Utopians by Utopian 
practices suggests how those practices would be rejected by human pride.  
This argument is supported by George M. Logan’s book,The Meaning of More's 
Utopia, where he interprets More’s Utopia as a work of satire that criticizes Hythloday’s 
“radical idealism” as consisting of a “closed inner world […] not open to […] correction, 
compromise or the interplay of perspective” (Logan 6). One such correction or interplay of 
perspective is Logan’s assessment of “the repressive character of the Utopian constitution” 
(230). Though Hythloday “expresses both the characteristic libertarianism of humanism and 
the relatively relaxed attitude of most humanists” (230) in Utopia,  Logan reveals that 
“Utopian life is highly regulated, and it exhibits all the greyness that seems an inevitable 
corollary of such regulation” (230). For example, when Hythloday’s describes how a Utopian 
who wants to travel “obtains leave very easily from the Syphogrant and Tranibors” (More 
75), his diction suggests relaxed laws and a high degree of freedom. However, the several 
other regulations of travel, such as the need for a passport, the time limit, and the mandatory 
travel companion (75), support Logan’s evaluation of Utopia as being highly regulated 
instead of relaxed and free. Logan’s repressive depiction of Utopia strengthens the perception 
that the way Utopian practices reduce its citizens’ freedom would thus be rejected by human 
pride because it insists on being free.  
Logan enters another area related to human pridefulness when he shows how 
“Utopian repressiveness reflects More's belief that a realistic assessment of man's nature 
suggests that the goal of freedom conflicts […] with the maintenance of stability and efficient 
production” (Logan 237). Logan thus argues that human beings’ natural desire for freedom 
will conflict with the stability and efficient production created by the repressive Utopian 
practices. This assessment supports my own argument as it reflects my claim of how 
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humanity’s inherent pride (or dignity) will desire autonomy and freedom, and thus reject the 
repressive Utopian practices that excessively control their lives.  
Similar to More’s argument on how the overwhelming control required for Utopian 
perfection would be rejected by human pride, Milton argues that humanity gains greater joys 
through the Fall as we must now consciously choose to accept God’s grace. Deni Kasa 
supports this argument in her article, “Arminian Theology, Machiavellian Republicanism, 
and Cooperative Virtue in Milton's Paradise Lost”. Kasa argues that “instead of 
overpowering believers, grace gradually regenerates them until they are again capable of 
voluntarily performing acts of faith” (Kasa). This is shown after Adam and Eve receive 
judgement from the Son after the Fall. At first, they languish and dwell in their sorrow, as 
Adam is “to sorrow abandoned” (Milton 10.717) and Eve was “weeping [in] her lonely 
plight” (10.937). But then Adam recalls “with what mild/ And gracious temper [God] both 
heard and judg'd/ Without wrauth or reviling” (10.1046-48), alluding to the grace God offers 
humanity, even after the Fall. The reassurance of this grace then encourages Adam to 
“prostrate fall/ Before [God] reverent, and there confess/ Humbly our faults, and pardon beg” 
(10.1087-89). Their initial sorrow reveals how, though grace is offered to humanity, we must 
choose to accept it and be regenerated. The consequent of this acceptance is depicted as 
virtue and faith as Adam and Eve humbly repent and confess their sins to God, suggesting 
their intention to earnestly pursue virtue. This creates a greater joy for humanity as we may 
choose to accept grace and thus be aided in our pursuit of virtue, rather than be forced to 
accept grace and obliged to choose virtue.  
Free will also enhances humanity’s joy as it enhances our dignity and virtue through 
our conscious decision of goodness over evil. After the Fall, we are renewed by grace and 
given the choice of virtue or sin. As Kasa states, “renewed righteousness [is] a capacity for 
free will in the present… Milton presents agency as a gift that flows down to human beings 
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from God, enabling them to pursue virtue and good works as voluntarily as Adam once did” 
(Kasa). This renewed righteousness is exemplified by Adam and Eve when, after the Fall, 
they reconcile with each other and seek God’s mercy together. Though initially Adam treats 
Eve with “stern regard” (Milton 10.866), calling her “false/ and hateful” (10.868-69), her 
sorrow and repentance assuaged his anger and he says, “let us no more contend, nor blame/ 
Each other, blam'd enough elsewhere, but strive/ In offices of Love” (10.958-960). Adam’s 
evident change of heart implies his conscious choice to forgive Eve and choose love and 
peace over hate and blame. His previous choice of hate and blame enhance the virtue of his 
later choice of love and peace as it affirms how he has experienced both good and evil and is 
now consciously choosing goodness. So, while humanity’s pride will reject Utopia’s 
excessive control as we desire autonomy and freedom, humanity will achieve greater joy 
after the Fall as our free will enhances the virtue of our conscious choice to pursue goodness.  
Milton further argues that humanity’s virtue after the Fall will be more pleasing to us 
since we must now freely choose to pursue virtue. This conscious choice would enhance 
humanity’s joy in being virtuous because our virtue would now carry more significance than 
it did if we simply chose it out of force or out of ignorance of evil. So, becoming aware of 
evil through the Fall increases humanity’s joy at being virtuous as we may now exercise our 
free will and consciously choose virtue; John C. Ulreich, Jr. supports this in “A Paradise 
Within: The Fortunate Fall in Paradise Lost” where he argues that “For Milton, the only thing 
that could possibly make the [Fall fortunate] is for it to be our guilt, the result of our own free 
choice” (Ulreich 352). Ulreich further claims that “To be of value, to God or himself, man’s 
love must be voluntary” (352). These arguments are supported by the text as God attributes 
humanity’s fall to free will and commends this free will, claiming “Not free, what proof 
could [humanity] have given sincere/ Of true allegiance, constant faith or love” (Milton 
3.103-104), and asking “What pleasure I from such obedience paid, /When will and reason 
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(reason also is choice)/ …Made passive both, had serv’d necessity, /Not me” (3.107-11). God 
highlights the necessity of free will in offering genuine obedience and suggests that virtue 
without conscious choice is unpleasing. This strengthens how, after the Fall, humanity’s 
virtue is more pleasing as we are able to genuinely and consciously choose to pursue virtue.  
Moreover, the Fall brings humanity greater joy as our conscious choice of virtue will 
lead us to consciously experience the benefits of virtue. This greater joy is foreshadowed by 
the angel Michael as he promises Adam and Eve that, though they must now leave Paradise, 
they will come to possess “A Paradise within [themselves], happier far” (12.587). This joy is 
also explained as Michael tells Adam, “Who seeks/ To lessen thee, against his purpose 
serves/ To manifest the more thy might: his evil/ Thou usest, and from thence createst more 
good” (8.613-16). These lines suggest that more good will come from the temptations of evil 
as humanity may exhibit their fortitude in consciously resisting evil and choosing virtue. 
Ulreich reflects my claim as he asserts how “morality depends…on the conscious avoidance 
of [evil]” (Ulreich 355). A conscious choice to be virtuous would then increase humanity’s 
joy as we would be consciously experiencing the benefits of virtue. In his article, Ulreich 
argues that “Obedience enables man to imitate God, not only to be like Him but to become 
more like Him” (362). In this sense, the Fall increases humanity’s joys as we may now 
consciously strive to be more like God in our virtue. This is suggested in the text as God 
predicts how humanity will, “by degrees of merit raised, /[…and] under long obedience tried” 
(Milton 7.156-58), be joined with God in “One kingdom, joy and union without end” (7.161). 
These lines emphasize humanity’s trials of obedience which, after the Fall, we must now 
consciously undergo, and humanity’s levels of virtues which we must now consciously 
cultivate. These conscious decisions to pursue virtue and obey God then increase our joy as 
we consciously work towards being joined with God. Milton’s emphasis on how free will to 
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choose to pursue virtue will bring humanity greater joy reflects More’s emphasis on how 
human pride desires autonomy and will thus reject the overwhelming control of Utopia. 
 
6. Instability as Ennobling, Imperfections as Glorifying 
Finally, human pride (or human dignity or honour) would reject any Utopian practices 
that cultivate the stable and perfect Utopian society because human pride prefers a degree of 
instability where they can triumph over challenges, rather than a boring life of untroubled, 
unchanging stability. Jordan B. Peterson supports this in his lecture, “Biblical Series VIII: 
The Phenomenology of the Divine”, where he argues that “we’re not built for static utopia: 
we’re built for a dynamic situation where there’s demands placed on us, and where there’s 
the optimal amount of uncertainty” (Peterson, Biblical Series, unpaginated lecture). This 
optimal amount of uncertainty would ennoble humanity by challenging us to overcome 
obstacles and inspiring us to work towards certain goals. In contrast, the perfect society of 
Utopia, where there is no adversity and no struggles, would bore humanity and eventually be 
rejected. Peterson supports this as he asserts how “a utopian vision of perfection [is] 
profoundly antihuman [as] human beings would go mad and break the system, smash it, just 
so that something unexpected and crazy could happen” (Peterson). He explains that “human 
beings don’t want utopian comfort and certainty. Human beings want adventure, chaos, and 
uncertainty” (Peterson). More’s novel supports this assessment as it demonstrates a static, 
boring perfection in the Utopians’ daily, idyllic schedules. For example, in a twenty-four 
hour day, the Utopians “appoint six of these for work, three of which are before dinner and 
three after; they then sup, and at eight o’clock, counting from noon, go to bed and sleep eight 
hours” (More 62). Utopians leisurely go through their day with no excessive labour, plenty of 
unoccupied time, and no obstacles or difficulties to be overcome. Over time, since 
humanity’s pride has nothing to overcome, this lack of challenges and abundance of spare 
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time would become boring and meaningless. Consequently, humanity would reject their 
perfect utopian system for a system with a higher degree of instability that would allow them 
to overcome challenges and thus be ennobled. So, human pride will desire a degree of 
instability since a dynamic situation will challenge us compared to the static, idyllic lifestyle 
of the Utopians that will only bore us.  
Though Utopians “must employ [their free time] in some proper exercise” (More 62), 
such as “public lectures every morning before daybreak” (62) or “[entertaining] each other 
either with music or discourse”, this does not solve the problem of their static stability (63). 
Though these practices ensure that Utopians constantly edify themselves and avoid vain or 
evil pleasures, they do not ensure any challenges or difficulties for humanity’s pride to 
overcome and feel ennobled by. In fact, the process of edifying themselves when there is no 
adversity or afflictions around them may devalue the edification as meaningless since there 
are no circumstances that would ever challenge or oppose their edification. Peterson explains 
how challenging circumstances would benefit human pride as he explores “the successful 
hero myth” (Peterson). He analyzes the story of Sleeping Beauty from a psychological 
perspective, where the prince “escapes [the witch], and then conquers the worst thing that can 
be imagined, and is ennobled by that” (Peterson). This shows how overcoming challenges 
can elevate and dignify ourselves, thus benefitting humanity’s pride. So, Peterson’s lecture on 
how human beings want, and are ennobled by, uncertainty strengthens the argument that 
human pride, which seeks to overcome challenges for honor or glory, would reject Utopian 
practices that create an overly stable society.  
In another lecture, “Notes on Reality and the Sacred”, Peterson also supports this 
argument as he explores the Daoist belief that the world “is made up essentially of chaos and 
order”, and that “the optimally meaningful life is to be found on the border between chaos 
and order” (Peterson, Notes on Reality, unpaginated lecture). He explains chaos as everything 
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we do not understand, where “you’re at sea or overwhelmed or things have fallen apart for 
you, and there’s too much of everything for you to deal with” (Peterson). Meanwhile, order is 
everything we do understand, where “nothing that’s interesting ever happens to you, nothing 
is anything but a repeat of all of all the things that you already know” (Peterson). Utopia’s 
society highly favors order, where nothing new happens and they repeat the same familiar 
routine every day (More 62). According to Peterson, this extreme does not provide an 
‘optimally meaningful life’. Instead of extremes, he advocates for the border between chaos 
and order where “you’re secure enough to be confident but not so secure that you’re bored, 
and you’re interested enough to be awake but not so interested that you’re terrified” 
(Peterson). This suggests that Utopian practices that cultivate stability and perfection will 
create an overly ordered society that will bore humanity. This also suggests that humanity 
will seek a degree of instability to challenge themselves and create a meaningful life. Both 
these implications support my argument of how human pride (or human dignity) will reject 
Utopian practices that create stability and perfection.  
As More argues that humanity desires a degree of instability in order to overcome 
challenges and be ennobled, so Milton argues that humanity achieves greater joys through the 
Fall as we are glorified when we participate in God’s salvation and triumph over evil. Sarah 
Van Der Laan supports this claim in “Waking Leucothea: An Unexplored Homeric Allusion 
in Paradise Lost” as she argues how “Milton constructs his model of human salvation [by 
presenting] human free will and an active partnership with the divine as heroic qualities, 
harnessed for heroic endeavours” (Van Der Laan 78). Van Der Laan explores how 
“Leukothea’s encounter with Odysseus illustrates the joint divine and human endeavour 
necessary to accomplish salvation. God provides the tools for salvation, but human beings 
must work with those tools, expending their own efforts to arrive safely at the shore” (75). 
These human efforts to achieve the salvation that God offers then brings glory to ourselves 
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and to God as we defeat evil, and Milton foreshadows this glory when he alludes to 
Leucothea in Paradise Lost: “Leucothea waked; and with fresh dews imbalmed/ The earth” 
(Milton 11.135-136). This allusion to humanity’s heroic efforts to achieve God’s salvation is 
followed by descriptions of how Adam and Eve “found/ Strength added from above; new 
hope to spring/ Out of despair” (11.137-39), and God’s “promise, that [Eve’s] seed shall 
bruise [their] foe” (11.155). These descriptions foreshadow humanity’s glorious triumphs 
over evil as God strengthens us against evil, grants us hope against temptation, and vows that 
humanity will be able to fight back against evil. These descriptions also highlight the joint 
effort of humanity and God to overcome evil; though God provides humanity with strength 
and hope, humanity must choose to use those tools to fight their own battles against evil. So, 
Milton’s allusion to Leucothea suggests how humanity achieves greater joys through the Fall 
as we may choose to participate in God’s salvation and consequently triumph gloriously over 
evil.  
The ability to choose to participate in God’s salvation grants humanity a degree of 
agency in overcoming our own temptations and challenges that then heightens our own 
glorious triumphs over evil. Van Der Laan supports this as she notes “the critical work free 
will must nevertheless do” (Van Der Laan 66) to participate in God’s salvation, arguing that 
Milton focuses on “each individual’s responsibility for his or her own behaviour and 
thoughts… and the power of men and women to affect their fate for good or ill” (67). This 
human agency is emphasized by the Son as He foreshadows how humanity will be “Tried in 
sharp tribulation, and refined/ By faith and faithful works” (Milton 11.63-64), which in turn 
“Resigns [humanity] up with Heaven and Earth renewed” (11.66). This speech underscores 
humanity’s effort in obtaining God’s salvation as the Son predicts how humanity will face 
challenging trials and highlights the constant labour that they must perform. This emphasizes 
each individual’s struggle with their own challenges and their own accountability in either 
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overcoming and learning from those challenges or being defeated by those challenges. The 
Son also places the onus on humanity to consistently cultivate and strengthen their faith and 
their relationship with God. This all foreshadows humanity’s extensive efforts to participate 
in God’s salvation. However, the Son’s speech also offers glory to humanity in eventually 
being restored and resurrected, joining God and the Son in heaven. This glory is only 
heightened by human agency and the onerous work that each individual must choose to do to 
achieve this glory. So, the Son predicts how humanity will achieve glory through the Fall as 
we may choose to work hard and triumph over evil. Overall, Milton’s suggests that humanity 
achieves greater joy in our imperfection by accomplishing glorious triumphs over evil, 




So far, I have outlined several Utopian practices that would realistically be rejected 
due to human pride and explained several ways in which humanity achieves greater joys after 
the Fall. Human pride would reject Utopian surveillance as we strive to avoid rebuke; Related 
to this, humanity achieves greater joy after the Fall as we come to experience, not God’s 
punishment or reproach, but His forgiveness. Next, human pride desires to be better than 
others and would thus reject the social and economic uniformity in Utopia; Similarly, 
humanity achieves greater joy after the Fall as we seek to better ourselves and thus please 
God with our repentance. Human pride would also reject Utopian stability since a degree of 
instability is required for humanity to overcome challenges and be ennobled; Likewise, 
humanity achieves greater joy after the Fall as we are glorified when we triumph over evil. 
Lastly, human pride would reject the overwhelming social control of Utopia as we desire to 
be in control of our own decisions; In the same way, humanity achieves greater joys after the 
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Fall as this heightens our free will in choosing virtue. These points argue for how Utopian 
perfection is not realistically desirable or achievable as several practices required for that 
perfection go against our natural pride. These points also argue for how humanity is able to 
achieve greater joys in our current state of imperfection than in our pre-Fall state of 
perfection. 
These are important arguments because they imply that perfection is not realistically 
desirable for humans, nor is it a guarantee of ultimate happiness for humans. If humanity 
would naturally reject Utopian practices, then Utopian perfection is not in fact desirable for 
humans. Likewise, if humanity can achieve greater joys in our state of imperfection, then 
perfection is not the panacea for all human problems that we often assume it is. These 
implications would, in turn, help ease the anxieties and miseries of those who strive for 
perfection in their lives— these implications suggest that perfection, while firstly being 
nearly impossible to achieve, is not even realistically desirable and will not make their lives 
better or happier. Another important implication of my argument is that human nature thrives 
under contexts of imperfection. Since humanity can achieve greater joys in our imperfections 
and would reject Utopian practices that ensure a perfectly stable and prosperous society, it 
follows that humans actually desire contexts of imperfection, such as Peterson’s example of a 
state balanced between order and chaos. This implication would help people feel more at 
peace with their present situations because they would acknowledge how their hardships can 
help them grow and thrive, instead of viewing their struggles as imperfections that should be 
eradicated. Overall, a reading of More’s Utopia and Milton’s Paradise Lost as questioning 
the realistic desirability of perfection could help people feel more at peace with themselves 
and their current circumstances.  
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Appendix: Presentation at the SPU Honors Research Symposium 
My honours project is entitled “The Realistic Desirability of Perfection in Thomas 
More’s Utopia and John Milton’s Paradise Lost”. This topic explores a question that has 
always been an area of interest and a cause of doubt in my religious faith. I have always 
wondered if people really desire a perfect world and society and why or why not. This 
question has serious religious implications for me as the answer will influence my perception 
of the garden of Eden, heaven, and our capacity for happiness in a fallen world. My honours 
project specifically shows how my English literature degree has supplemented and 
strengthened my faith by allowing me to explore religious questions that the Bible has not 
answered for me. Religious issues such as death, love, and sin are often addressed in works of 
literature. By analyzing and interpreting such works, I receive different perspectives on 
religious issues and can contemplate my own opinions on those issues. The two literary 
works that I have studied are suitable to explore my topic as they both discuss perfect worlds. 
Milton’s Paradise Lost describes the original Garden of Eden and how we lost that perfection 
while More’s Utopia describes the extreme measures that would create a perfect society. 
Though their reasonings differ, Milton and More both posit through their works that though 
humanity thinks they desire perfection, they actually prefer contexts of imperfection; Milton 
suggests how our fallenness enhances our relationship with God, allowing us to experience 
God in a different way, such as grace, mercy, and forgiveness, while More suggests how 
human pride makes perfection impossible and undesirable to humanity.  
In Paradise Lost, several characters support my argument that humanity shall achieve 
greater joys through the Fall. For example, as the angel Michael is escorting Adam and Eve 
out of Eden, he comforts them by promising them a paradise that they will achieve within 
themselves that will surpass the joy they had in Eden. So, Milton suggests that the Fall, 
despite descending humanity into a state of imperfection, allows humanity to achieve greater 
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happiness within that imperfect state. In More’s Utopia, the two characters’ ending comments 
on utopian practices raise doubts on the feasibility and desirability of those practices. For 
example, Hythloday praises Utopian practices and wishes that the world would be so wise as 
to imitate them, but he also admits that it would be unrealistic to implement Utopian practices 
in the world because human pride would be too big a hindrance. Human pride may be 
interpreted as either a sinful pride (such as arrogance, vanity, or conceit) or a healthy pride 
(such as self-esteem or dignity). Hythloday’s reference to human pride seems to assume the 
first meaning, asserting how Utopia would be a perfect society if sinful pride did not reject it. 
My paper will use both interpretations of human pride to show how Utopian perfection would 
be rejected. My first two points use the first interpretation of sinful pride to heighten how 
humanity is imperfect and will thus not accept or fit in a perfect world or society. I 
supplement these points with my analysis of Milton’s Paradise Lost that suggests how we are 
happier in imperfect contexts anyways. My last two points use the second interpretation of 
healthy pride to highlight how Utopian perfection necessarily violates humanity’s self-worth 
and dignity, and does not allow humanity to redeem their fallenness by striving against evil. I 
strengthen these points with my analysis of Milton’s Paradise Lost that shows how contexts 
of imperfection do allow for these things.  
So in my first point, to explore my topic of the realistic desirability of perfection, I 
discuss how human pride would reject Utopian practices that open them to endless rebuke 
from others, such their extensive surveillance practices where everyone observes everyone. I 
compare this endless rebuke of Utopia with Milton’s suggestion of how humanity’s 
fallenness leads us to greater joys by allowing us to experience God in new and different 
ways, such as through His mercy, grace and forgiveness. Contrasting the rebuke in Utopia 
with the forgiveness of a fallen world reveals how the measures necessary for the perfection 
of Utopia will be rejected by human pride and how we will find greater joys in the contexts 
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of imperfection of a fallen world as our fallenness allows us to experience being forgiven and 
receiving mercy and grace. Next, I explore how the Utopian practices that enforce social and 
economic uniformity would be rejected by human pride because human pride pushes people 
to strive to be different (and thus better) than others. I compare this with More’s suggestion 
of how we achieve greater joy in our imperfect, fallen state as we seek to better ourselves and 
repent to God, thus pleasing Him. This comparison shows how utopian practices would be 
rejected as people desire to be better than others while More’s fallen world leads to joy as 
humanity can now seek to better themselves. So, the very reason a utopian practice (which 
allegedly leads to perfection) would be rejected becomes the same source of joy in a fallen 
world.  
In my next point, I explore how the Utopian practices that assert an overwhelming 
control over the personal lives of utopians would be rejected as humanity’s pride desires 
autonomy. I compare this with Milton’s argument that humanity gains greater joys through 
the Fall as we must now consciously choose to accept God’s grace. This comparison 
demonstrates how utopian practices would be rejected because they reduce humanity’s 
agency over their own lives while Milton’s fallen world leads to joy as it increases 
humanity’s agency to live in sin or accept God’s grace. Finally, I explore how human pride 
would reject any Utopian practices that cultivate the stable and perfect Utopian society 
because human pride prefers a degree of instability where they can triumph over challenges, 
rather than a boring life of untroubled, unchanging stability. I compare this with Milton’s 
argument of how humanity achieves greater joys through the Fall as we are glorified when 
we participate in God’s salvation and triumph over evil. This comparison illustrates how 
utopian perfection would be rejected as too stable while Milton’s fallen world provides joy as 
the instability provided by sin allows humanity to be glorified when we triumph over it. All 
my points explore how utopian practices that cultivate perfection are not realistically 
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desirable, several practices would be rejected for various reasons. Meanwhile, all these points 
of contention are reversed in the contexts of imperfections in a fallen world to lead to greater 
joys. For example, we would reject utopian practices that enforce uniformity because we 
strive to be different and thus better than others, and this desire to be better leads to greater 
joy in a fallen world as we seek to better ourselves.  
I conclude my paper by exploring the implications of my research: my arguments 
imply that perfection is not realistically desirable for humans, nor is it a guarantee of ultimate 
happiness for humans. This could help ease the anxieties and miseries of those who strive for 
perfection in their lives as these implications suggest that perfection, while firstly being 
nearly impossible to achieve, is not even realistically desirable and will not make their lives 
better or happier. Another important implication of my argument is that human nature thrives 
under contexts of imperfection. This implication would help people feel more at peace with 
their present situations because they would acknowledge how their hardships can help them 
grow and thrive, instead of viewing their struggles as imperfections that should be eradicated. 
Overall, a reading of More’s Utopia and Milton’s Paradise Lost as questioning the realistic 
desirability of perfection could help people feel more at peace with themselves and their 
current circumstances.  
One topic that my research paper relates to is how research is a process of inquiry 
where we ask a question, we conduct research to answer that question, we conclude our 
research not only with an answer to our original question but also with multiple other 
questions that sprang from our research, and hopefully we continue to search for answers to 
the never-ending stream of questions. My research paper demonstrates this process of inquiry 
as it began with a religious question I had contemplated for some time which was, what will 
heaven be like? From within my context of sin and imperfection, I tried to understand the 
concept of heaven where everything would be made perfect. I could not find a model that was 
Tan 36 
agreeable to me because if we entered heaven as we are we would make it imperfect, but if 
our imperfections were purged from us then we would not be ourselves. However, given the 
Christian assumption that everything will be made perfect in heaven, I concluded that the first 
model of heaven (where we enter as we are, thus making heaven imperfect) could be rejected 
and the second model of heaven (where our imperfections are purged from us) could be 
accepted. So, this answered my original question of what heaven will be like. But this then 
led me to another question as my image of heaven then consisted of people that were not 
quite human, happiness that was not quite joy. This led me to question why I viewed 
perfection in heaven so strangely, and I concluded that it may be because I saw imperfections 
and flaws as intrinsic to humanity and to our happiness. This conclusion confused me 
because it suggested that perfection is not perfect (or at least it does not offer perfect 
happiness) while imperfection is preferable (and offers a richer joy than perfection does).  
So, this answer finally led me to the question of my research paper: do humans 
realistically desire perfection or are we happier within our contexts of imperfection? I 
conducted research to answer this question by focusing on two literary works that provide 
examples of both a perfect society and a fallen society. By analysing these texts and 
comparing them, I was able to explore the measures necessary for perfection, the feasibility 
of implementing these measures in a human society, the mindsets in a fallen society, and the 
joys available to those in a fallen society. My research yielded the following answers to my 
question: perfection is not realistically desirable in a human society because we live within 
contexts of imperfection and these contexts also allow for several joys that contexts of 
perfection do not allow for. I think these answers are important because it could help people 
who strive for perfection understand that perfection is an unattainable ideal. This could help 
them feel more at peace with their own progress or status, thus creating a healthier and more 
effective mindset for them to strive to improve themselves. However, since research is a 
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process of inquiry that should never end, the conclusion of my research paper has created 
several new lines of inquiry to be explored. For example, if perfection is not realistically 
desirable and does not make us happier, this means that we should accept our flaws and our 
sins. But how can we know how to moderate this and consolidate our acceptance of our flaws 
with a constant struggle to improve ourselves? When may we embrace our fallenness and 
when must we repent for our sins? On the other hand, there could be religious implications 
from the conclusions of my research paper. My conclusion was that perfection is not 
realistically desirable in human societies. This could make someone question the realistic 
desirability of heaven but it could also support our strong need for God since perfection by 
ourselves is not perfect. If perfection by itself is insufficient in making us happy, this may 
suggest our need for something more, something spiritual or divine, like a god. This could 
lead to questions about heaven and how we will be changed in heaven and how exactly we 
will be happy in that context of perfection.  
On another note, religion necessarily coincides with morality as our moral systems 
and values are created or dependant on our religious beliefs. So, my project also relates to 
how humans are moral, believing animals as it alludes to a Christian sense of perfection. In 
Christianity, there is the idea that when we die, we will be resurrected and ascend to heaven 
where we, and everything else, will be made perfect. This idea is entrenched in the doctrine 
that God makes humans inherently perfect but the flawed world that we live in inevitably 
makes us imperfect sinners. So, because we are made by God, we have an intrinsic perfection 
within us, but as soon as we are born into this fallen world we are tainted and can be seen as 
sinners. This doctrine of perfection provides a context for some believers to live in that 
reminds them that perfection and perfect happiness will be attained in the afterlife. This can 
be a source of joy and comfort for some people as they look forward to a state of eternal 
perfection in the afterlife while they live within this world that they view as imperfect and 
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sinful. However, some people who believe in this doctrine of perfection (that we have an 
intrinsic perfection within us) may begin striving for perfection in their current situations. 
These people may view hardships or struggles as imperfections and begin working 
incessantly to fix those imperfections or feel bad about those imperfections. This mindset is 
unsustainable as it cultivates the habit of fixating on what’s going wrong and thus fixating on 
one’s own inability to make things perfect and failing to reward or acknowledge one’s own 
achievements. This leads to the belief that one is never good enough. This becomes a 
demoralizing state of mind that would eventually lead to burn out. Furthermore, as I explore 
in the conclusion of my research paper, this desire for perfection is not sustainable nor the 
key to perfect happiness. In fact, as I just mentioned, striving for perfection may be highly 
detrimental to our happiness and effectiveness. This desire for perfection is not sustainable 
because we live in a flawed world so our quest for perfection will inevitably and incessantly 
fall short, causing us to work harder and harder for something that is unattainable. This will 
lead to a huge detriment on our mental health, our morale, and our self-esteem as we 
convince ourselves that we are striving for something reasonable and attainable, and that the 
reason we fail to attain it is due to something inferior within ourselves. In addition to 
perfection being an unattainable ideal, my research paper also explores how, even if we did 
attain perfection, we would inevitably reject it because we prefer our contexts of imperfection 
and the liberties and joys that those contexts allow us. For example, the Utopian practices that 
create a perfect, stable and safe society would be rejected because we prefer our contexts of 
imperfection that allows for some instability. This instability allows us to be challenged and 
allows us to test ourselves, to fail or succeed in these trials.  
So, not only is chasing perfection unsustainable, it is also not the road to perfect 
happiness since this pursuit would reduce our happiness and because we would reject 
perfection even if we did attain it. In my research paper, I conclude that a more sustainable 
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way of navigating our contexts of imperfection is to accept them and to strive, not for a 
perfection that is vague and unattainable, but to simply improve and better oneself. Chasing 
perfection within our contexts of imperfection is like running a race with no finish line. We 
frantically run faster and faster, desperate to reach the finish line, but we gradually get more 
tired and defeated, and there is no prize or end goal on the horizon. However, accepting our 
contexts of imperfection and striving to gradually improve ourselves is more like walking 
uphill, with small checkpoints. This is a much more sustainable mode of being as we strive to 
better ourselves, but we are not frantic or desperate because we can set attainable goals for 
ourselves that we can realistically see ourselves achieving. This method of navigating our 
contexts of imperfection also has several checkpoints where we can rest or reward ourselves 
for our efforts and achievements. This creates a healthy state of mind that acknowledges our 
own imperfections but is not defeated by them or desperate to escape them. Instead, this state 
of mind is happier by accepting our contexts of imperfection as it can now create attainable 
and realistic goals. By doing this, we strike a balance between striving to improve ourselves 
and accepting our imperfections. Neither complacent nor frantic, this state of mind can 
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